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Southern Kurils or Northern Territories? 
Resolving the Russo-Japanese Border Dispute 
Although the guns of World War I1 were mercifully 
silenced over forty-five years ago, Japan and Russia (formerly 
the Soviet Union) have regrettably never formally concluded 
the war. The on-going conflict is caused by a boundary dispute 
involving a small group of islands, just north of Hokkaido, 
known by the Russians as the Southern Kuril' Islands, but 
known to the Japanese as the Northern Territories. 
The total area of the disputed territory is not large: but 
conflicting claims to the islands have prevented both countries 
from signing a formal treaty to end the Second World War.3 
Important factors bearing on each country's reluctance to  give 
up the Kurils include strategic significance, a valuable fishing 
industry, and emotional atta~hment.~ The lengthy dispute has 
gained new significance in light of rece~t  developments in the 
former Soviet Bloc-the quarrel over the islands constitutes a 
major barrier in negotiations for much needed economic aid 
from Japan to the newly formed Commonwealth of Indepen- 
dent  state^.^ 
This comment analyzes both the Russian and Japanese 
claims to these islands from a strictly legal, as opposed to polit- 
ical, standpoint. Section I1 of this comment presents a factual 
overview of the problem. Section I11 briefly discusses the dis- 
1. Sometimes spelled "Kurile." This comment uses "Kuril" except when quoting 
or directly referring to sources which use "Kurile." 
2. Together, the islands make up an area of 4996 square kilometers. 
RAJENDRA K. JAIN, THE USSR AND JAPAN 1945-1980 50 (1981); MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES 3 (1987) [hereinafter 
JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES]. 
3. JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, a t  1. 
4. See, e.g., JOHN J. STEPHAN, THE KURIL ISLANDS 119-24, 208-09 (1974); 
JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, at  1. 
5. See Ronald E. Yates, Japan, Soviets Seek Accord over Islands, CHI.  TRIB., 
Apr. 14, 1991, 8 1, at 21; Japan Asks Soviets for Two Islands Now, WASH. RMES, 
Mar. 20, 1991, at A7. Following the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the Kurils became part of the Russian Federation. Japan Recognizes Russia, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Dec. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni 
File. 
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pute in terms of customary international law. Section IV con- 
siders the legal claims to the islands based on international 
agreements. This comment concludes that Japan has strong 
legal claims to part, but not all, of the disputed territory. 
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The Kurils6 are a chain of over thirty volcanic islands that 
stretch approximately 1200 kilometers in a northeast to  south- 
west axis from the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula t o  
the northeastern tip of Hokkaido. The Russo-Japanese bound- 
ary dispute centers around four of these islands. Two of the 
islands, Etorofu7 and Kunashiri: are the southernmost 
islands of the Kuril chain. The other disputed islands lie south- 
east of Etorofu and Kunashiri. They are known in Russia as 
the "Little Kurils" and in Japan as Shikotan and the Habomai 
 island^.^ As a whole, Russia refers to the disputed islands as 
the "Southern Kurils and Little Kurils," while Japan calls the 
islands its "Northern Territ~ries."'~ Sakhalin Island, not a 
part of the Kurils, also has historical significance in the dis- 
pute. Sakhalin lies along the Eurasian coast directly west of 
the Kuril chain." 
Russo-Japanese contests for control of Sakhalin and the 
Kuril Islands have existed for as long as the history of the is- 
lands is verifiable. Japanese and Russian writers disagree as t o  
who was actually the first to discover and settle the Kurils.12 
6. Unless otherwise specifled, the term "Kuril Islands" in this comment means 
the entire chain of Kuril Islands, including the four disputed islands. 
7. InRussian, Yturup." 
8. In Russian, "Kunashir." 
9. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 11. 
10. See RODGER SWEARINGEN, THE SOVIET UNION AND POSTWAR JAPAN: ESCA- 
LATING CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 186-88 (1978). Some extreme Japanese groups 
have made claims to the entire chain of the Kuril Islands as well as the southern 
half of Sakhalin Island. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at  197. However, the official 
position of the Japanese government limits territorial claims to the four islands 
described in the text. See JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2. 
11. JOHN J. STEPHAN, SAKHALIN: A HISTORY v (1971) [hereinafter SAKHALIN: A 
HISTORY]. The Japanese refer to Sakhalin as Karafuto. 
12. An exchange between the Russian and Japanese negotiators to  the 1855 
Treaty of Shimoda provides an excellent example of the difficulty of determining 
who had first claim on the Kurils. In arguing that the Kurils belonged to  Russia, 
Admiral Putiatin urged that the Russians had lived on the northern islands for 
over 100 years. The Japanese were not impressed, however, and quickly retorted 
that the Japanese had been there for over 1000 years! Neither claim is document- 
ed. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 87. See also 3 JAMES MURDOCH, A HISTORY OF 
JAPAN, part 2, 595 (Joseph H. Longford ed., Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1964). 
Undoubtedly, the issue has become politicized. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 31. 
As an example of the political aspect of the discovery issue, Stephan states that a 
"book published [by a Russian historian] as late as June 1945 conceded that [the] 
Japanese . . . discovered Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais, but this passage 
was deleted in a revised edition that appeared two years later." Id. at 204 (citing 
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Regardless of who was first, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that by the end of the eighteenth century, Russia had closer 
ties with the northern Kurils while Japan had closer ties with 
the southern islands.13 
The Treaty of Shimoda, signed in 1855, established the 
first Russo-Japanese boundary line in the Kurils between the 
islands of Etorofu and Uruppu.14 Japan received rights to 
Etorofu and all islands to the south while Russia received 
Uruppu and all islands to the north.15 The Treaty of Shimoda 
was amended in 1875 by the Treaty of St. Petersburg.16 This 
treaty gave Japan full right and title to  the entire Kuril Island 
chain. In exchange, Japan ceded to Russia any and all of its 
claims to Sakhalin Island.'? Japan reclaimed the southern 
half of Sakhalin at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War 
with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905." 
A. So~ovIov, KURILSKIE OSTROVA 6 (1945); A. SOLOVIOV, KURILSKIE OSTROVA 4-7 
(1947)). 
13. See STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 31-56. 
14. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at  88. The Treaty of Shimoda was the result of a 
series of peaceful negotiations between Japanese and Russian representatives. See 
icl. at  86-88. 
15. Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and 
Russia, Feb. 7, 1855, Japan-Russia, art. 11, 112 Consol. T.S. 467-471 (French text), 
reprinted in STEPHAN, supra note 4, at  237 (English translation) (citing JAPAN, 
FOREIGN OFFICE, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS BETWEEN THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN AND 
OTHER POWERS TOGETHER WITH UNIVERSAL CONVENTIONS, REGULATIONS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SINCE MARCH 1854, at  585 (rev. ed. 1884)) [hereinafter Treaty of 
Shipoda]. The Treaty of Shimoda specifically left unpartitioned the island of 
Sakhalin (located along the coast of northeast Asia and not part of the Kurils). Id. 
Article I1 of the Treaty of Shimoda is reproduced in the appendix. See also HUGH 
BORTON, JAPAN'S MODERN CENTURY 38 (1955); JAIN, supra note 2, a t  1, 50; 3 
MURDOCH, supra note 12, a t  612; STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  88; SWEARINGEN, 
supra note 10, at 5. 
16. Treaty for the Mutual Cession of Territory between Japan and Russia, May 
7, 1875, Japan-Russia, art. 11, 149 Consol. T.S. 179-82 (French text), reprinted in 
STEPHAN, supra note 4, at  237-38 (citing JAPAN, FOREIGN OFFICE, DAI NIHON 
GAIKO BUNSHO, VIII, 216-26 (1940)) (English translation) [hereinafter Treaty of St. 
Petersburg]. Article I1 of the Treaty of St. Petersburg is reproduced in the appen- 
dix. The 1875 treaty was also the result of peaceful negotiations between Japan 
and Russia. See STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  92-95. 
17. See STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  93-94; JAIN, supra note 2, at  50-51; 
SWEARINGEN, supra note 10, a t  5, 189. The Japanese public apparently was unhap- 
py with the Treaty of St. Petersburg because of the general feeling that Japan had 
traded Japanese territory (Sakhalin Island) in exchange for territory they felt 
already belonged to Japan (the Northern Kurils). See STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  
94-95. This suggests that the Japanese gave little credence to  the Treaty of 
Shimoda. 
18. SAKHALIN: A HISTORY, supra note 11, at  198. Both countries were unhappy 
with the treaty because both felt they had legitimate claims to all of Sakhalin 
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In the early part of World War 11, the Russians and the 
Japanese mutually agreed to  what has been described as a 
"strange neutrality."lg Both countries promised to  maintain 
"peaceful and friendly relations" with each other.20 Yet, at 
least one historian surmises that "neither side felt bound to 
[honor] the Neutrality Pact. . . one moment longer than it 
served strategic needs."21 The Soviet Union expressly 
renounced the Neutrality Pact by signing the secret Yalta 
Agreement on February 11, 1945.~~ Under the agreement, the 
Soviets promised to join the war effort against Japan within 
two months after Germany's surrender. In exchange, the Unit- 
ed States and Great Britain promised to return Sakhalin Is- 
land and to "hand over" the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Un- 
ion.23 
The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 9, 
1945.~~ The Russian invasion of the Kurils began on August 
18, three days after Japan ~urrendered.~~ By September 4, the 
Russian armada had taken possession of the entire Kuril Is- 
land chain, including the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
Shikotan, and the Habomai~ .~~  On September 20, all property 
on the islands was nationalized and all of the islands were 
declared Soviet territory? The Soviet Constitution was 
amended to include the islands as part of the Soviet Union on 
February 25, 1947." With only a few exceptions, the Japanese 
on the Kurils were repatriated in the years 1947-50.~' 
The most recent international agreement regarding the 
status of the Kuril Islands is the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 
Island. See id. at  80-81. 
19. GEORGE A. LENSEN, THE STRANGE NEUTRALITY: SOVIETJAPANESE RELATIONS 
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1941-1945 (1972). 
20. SovietJapanese Neutrality Pact, Apr. 13, 1941, art. I, reprinted in STEPHAN, 
supra note 4, at  239-40 (citing JAPAN, FOREIGN OFFICE, NIHON GAIKO NENPYO 
NARABI S m O  BUNSHO, 11, 491-92 (1965)) [hereinaRer Neutrality Pact]. Articles I- 
111 of the Neutrality Pact are reproduced in the appendix. 
21. STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  144. 
22. Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945: Entry of Soviet Union into War Against 
Japan, Feb. 11, 1945, 3 Bevans 1022 [hereinafter Yalta Agreement]. The relevant 
text of the Yalta Agreement is reproduced in the appendix. 
23. Id. 
24. STEPHAN, supra note 4, a t  160. 
25. Id. at 162-64. 
26. Id. at  165-66. 
27. Id. at  168. 
28. Id. at  169. 
29. Id. at  166-69. 
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1951. In that document, Japan renounced "all right, title and 
claim to the Kurile  island^."^^ The Soviet Union was not a 
signatory to this treaty, nor to any other treaty formally ending 
the war with Japan. 
One important source of international law is "international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."31 
Historically, discovery, occupation, and conquest have all been 
recognized methods of acquiring territory under customary 
international law.3z In light of customary international law, 
the dispute over the Kurils raises two issues. The first is 
whether either country can validly claim sovereignty over the 
disputed islands based on prior discovery and occupation. The 
second is whether Russia may claim sovereignty over any or all 
of the disputed islands based on conquest.33 
A. Prior Discovery and Occupation 
A fundamental tenet of the Japanese argument is that the 
four islands in dispute (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the 
Habomai group) were discovered and settled by the Japanese 
and, prior to 1945, had never been occupied by any country 
other than Japan. A publication by the Japanese Government, 
seeking to rally a movement for the return of the four disputed 
islands, states, "Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were known 
to the Japanese long before they became known to the Rus- 
sians. It was Japan which actually developed these northern 
regions . . . . [Tlhe Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu 
have never been the territory of a foreign country but have 
always been inherent Japanese territory."34 Other sources also 
document Japan's historical claims of prior discovery and set- 
t l e m e ~ ~ t . ~ ~  On the other hand, the Russians discount Japan's 
30. Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. II, para. c, 3 
U.S.T. 3169, 3172 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace with Japan]. Article 11, paragraph c 
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan is reproduced in the appendix. As will be noted, 
infrcz note 125 and accompanying text, Japan claims that the four islands in 
dispute are not part of the "Kurile Islands." 
31. JOSEPH M.SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (3d ed. 1988). 
32. See infia part 1II.A-B. 
33. Claims based on international agreements are examined below. See infia 
part IV. 
34. JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, a t  4, 6. 
35. See, e.g., JAIN, supra note 2, a t  52 ("Japan's position is that the [islands] 
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historical claims and argue that  Russians were the first to dis- 
cover the K ~ r i l s . ~ ~  
The idea that a sovereign state may obtain territory by 
right of discovery and occupation is hardly open to dispute. 
Professor Gerhard von Glahn wrote: 
Discovery is the oldest and, historically, the most important 
method of acquiring title to territory. Up to the eighteenth 
century, discovery alone sufficed to establish a legal title, but 
since then such discovery has had to be followed by an effec- 
tive occupation in order to be recognized as  the basis of a title 
to territ~ry.~'  
Hugo Grotius referred to occupation of territory as "the only 
natural and primary mode of acquis i t i~n."~~ Writers of inter- 
national law treatises are in unanimous agreement that "occu- 
pation" of unappropriated territory is a valid method of acquir- 
ing territory under traditional (customary) international law.39 
However, the requirement of occupation has not always 
been a part of international law. In prior centuries, mere dis- 
covery of new territory appears to have given valid title to 
territory.40 It  is unclear exactly when the requirement of occu- 
pation arose and whether it existed a t  the time the Kurils were 
discovered. One writer suggests that the requirement arose in  
the eighteenth ~entury .~ '  
Even if the historical law of prior discovery were clear, 
applying i t  in the case of the Kuril islands would pose great 
difficulty since it is unclear who discovered and occupied the 
are 'inalienable' and 'inherent' Japanese lands"); STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 209 
(popular consensus in Japan is that Kurils are historically Japanese). 
36. See STEPHAN, supm note 4, at  31, 87. See also SWEARINGEN, supra note 10, 
at 189-90 (recounting Japanese and Soviet historical claims). 
37. GERHARD VON G u m ,  LAW AMONG NATIONS 311 (5th ed. 1986). 
38. 2 HUGO GROTWS, DE J ~ E  B LLI AC PACIS LIBRI T ~ s ,  bk. 11, ch. 111, § 
IV, cl: 1 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925); see also E. DE VAITEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AW, bk. I, $ 207 (Charles G. Fenwick 
trans., 1916). 
39. See, e.g., LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNA- 
TIONAL LAW 118-19 (1989) (occupation of unappropriated territory is a method of 
acquiring territory under traditional international law); 3 J.H.W. VEELZIJL, INTER- 
NATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 349-53 (1970) (occupation of terra 
nullius is valid for state acquisition of territory); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNA- 
TIONAL LAW 343-44 (3d ed. 1948) (occupation is the most important method of 
acquiring territory as between states). 
40. See 3 VERZIJL, supra note 39, at  325. 
41. FENWICK, supra note 39, at 344 (footnote omitted). 
734 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 11992 
Kurils first.42 Given this difficulty, the best analytical solution 
is to resolve the issues by examining the alternatives. 
To simplify the issues as much as possible, assume that 
whichever country first discovered the disputed islands com- 
plied with the international law sufficient to obtain title to the 
territory. Under this assumption, the only issue to be resolved 
is whether the discovering country may continue to base its 
claim to the territory on right of prior discovery. 
In  Russia's case, the historical claim fails. Any "prior dis- 
covery" claims Russia may have had to the disputed islands 
were bartered away in the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855." Un- 
der the express terms of that treaty, Russia gave up all of its 
claims to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and 
Habomai in exchange for clear title to the northern Kuril Is- 
l a n d ~ . ~ ~  Subsequent treaties and events modified the Treaty of 
Shimoda and further abrogated Russia's historical claims to the 
disputed t e r r i t ~ r i e s . ~ ~  
The Japanese claim of prior discovery,. though slightly 
stronger, is not strong enough to resolve the conflict complete- 
ly. Under the assumption that Japan secured title to the is- 
lands by first discovery and occupation, its title remains clear 
at least until World War 11. However, the treaties and interna- 
tional agreements arising out of World War I1 may give Japan 
the same legal problems as the Treaty of Shimoda gave Russia, 
at least insofar as the Japanese claim to the islands is based on 
prior discovery. Arguably, Japan gave away its claim to the 
islands by accepting the Potsdam Declaration and by signing 
the Treaty of San Francisco. A full discussion of these agree- 
ments, including their legal effect and the weight of the argu- 
ment that Japan gave away its claims to the islands, is re- 
served for Section IV. 
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. It is perhaps axiomatic that 
international agreements such as treaties modify and preempt customary interna- 
tional law. As one writer notes, "States may abrogate a customary rule simply by 
concluding a treaty . . . ." MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TREATIES 36 (1985). Villiger also argues that, while a treaty abrogates customary 
law, new customary law may in turn modify a treaty. Id. 
44. Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. II. 
45. For a discussion of subsequent treaties, see infra part IV.B.1. 
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B. Conquest 
The events that occurred at the close of World War I1 raise 
the second question of whether the Soviet Union may claim 
title to the Northern Territories based on conquest. It is undis- 
puted that, at the close of the war, Soviet forces invaded all of 
the Kurils and successfully occupied them." However, the le- 
gal effect of the Soviet take-over of the islands is less clear. 
The first issue to resolve is whether, in 1945, international 
law permitted a country to acquire title to territory by 
conquest. As is often the case in international law, the authori- 
ties do not provide a clear an~wer.~' In the past, conquest was 
clearly a "common and legally recognized form of acquisition of 
title to territory?' More recently, this rule has been modified, 
although precisely when and to what extent the rule has 
changed is difficult to determine. By examining the writings of 
, 
international legal scholars who wrote at or near the middle of 
this century, one discovers at least four different views. 
First, some scholars who wrote during the 1940s and 1950s 
felt that conquest remained a valid way for a state to  acquire 
new territory. One respected scholar, writing in 1952 on a 
conquerorys ability to annex territory, stated that "[ilnternatio- 
nal [llaw sets no limit-other than that determined by compel- 
ling considerations of humanity-to the discretion of the victor 
in determining the conditions of the armist i~e."~~ However, 
this view ignores a trend among the family of nations by the 
46. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
47. In addressing an unrelated international legal question, a U.S. District 
Court Judge lamented the difficulty that often arises in attempting to define 
international law. He stated, "The absence of a consensus on international law, 
particularly with respect to technical issues created by the wide array of legal 
systems in the world, makes it 'hard even to imagine that harmony ever would 
characterize this issue.' " Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
48. SWEENEN ET AL., supra note 31, at 889; see also 3 VERZIJL, supra note 39, 
at 356; FENWICK, supra note 39, at 360. 
49. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 265a (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 
1952); see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 171-72 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 
6th ed. 1963) (stating that there may be moral objections to obtaining title by 
conquest, but it still occurs); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-70 (2d 
ed. 1934) (recognizing conquest as a method of obtaining legal title). By 1948, 
Fenwick had apparently experienced a change of heart. See infra notes 54-56 and 
accompanying text. 
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1940s not to recognize conquest as a valid method of territorial 
a~quisition.~' 
A second view found in the writings of mid-century legal 
scholars is that acquisition of territory by conquest is possible, 
but only on condition that the conqueror formally annex the 
territory in question.51 "Conquest is the taking of possession of 
territory of an enemy state by [military] force; it becomes a 
mode of acquisition of territory-and hence of transfer of sover- 
eignty--only if the conquered territory is effectively reduced to 
possession and annexed by the conquering state."52 This view 
has the weakness of placing form over substance. Once a state 
has taken territory by conquest and firmly possesses it, unilat- 
eral annexation of that territory is a mere formality. This sug- 
gested rule also lacks any sort of compelling rationale. 
The third view is that the legality of acquisition of territory 
by conquest is, at best, q~estionable.~~ International legal 
scholar Charles Fenwick supported this proposition in his 1948 
edition of International Law. Fenwick wrote, 'With the adop- 
tion of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920 and with 
the formal renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy by the Kellogg Pact[,] conquest lost its validity as a 
[method of obtaining] legal title to territory."54 Fenwick sup- 
ported his position by noting that when hostilities erupted 
between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932, nineteen American 
Republics announced to the two countries that " 'they [would] 
not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy 
which has not been obtained by peaceful means nor the validity 
of territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occu- 
pation or conquest by force or arms.'"55 In addition, Fenwick 
referred t o  the 1940 Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ameri- 
50. See infia notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
51. See 1 GREEN H .  HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427 (1940); cf. 
1 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 106 (2d ed. 1945) (property may be 
transferred by conquest and formal annexation but states are concerned with 
whether it may be done unilaterally). As previously stated, supra notes 26-28 and 
accompanying text, the Soviet Union did officially annex the territory it took from 
Japan by conquest at  the close of World War 11. 
52. 1 HACKWORTH, supra note 51, at 427. 
53. See OSCAR SVARLTEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 178 (1955) 
("The legality, under any and all circumstances, of the acquisition of territory 
through conquest and subjugation is . . . open to question."). 
54. FENWICK, supm note 39, a t  360. 
55. Id. a t  361 (quoting Report of the League of Nations Commission on the 
Chaco Dispute Between Bolivia and Paraguay, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 137, 168 (Supp. 
1934)). 
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can Republics a t  Havana, which addressed the conquests of the 
Axis powers in Europe. The ministers then declared that 
" 'force can not constitute the basis of rights, and [the American 
Republics] condemn all violence whether under the form of con- 
quest, of stipulations which may have been imposed by the 
belligerents in the clauses of treaty, or by any other 
process."'56 Thus, Fenwick provided solid support for the 
proposition that, by the end of World War 11, acquisition of 
territory by conquest was no longer recognized as a valid meth- 
od of acquiring title to land. 
The fourth mid-century view of conquest as a claim to 
territory holds that, in a real world sense, the issue presents a 
"political rather than a legal q~estion."~' Under this view, 
whether territory may be taken by conquest distills into a polit- 
ical question of whether territory is taken by "aggrandizement" 
or in good faith to defend oneself against the aggressor 
state.58 While this theory may reflect the real world of interna- 
tional  relation^:^ it does not resolve the question of whether 
Russia is obligated, under international law, to return to Japan 
the islands conquered by the Soviet Union a t  the end of World 
War 11. 
The third view stated above is probably the most accurate 
summation of the state of the law a t  the end of World War 11. 
Fenwick gives persuasive examples to support the view that, by 
mid-century, conquest of territory was not a legally recognized 
method of obtaining title to lands. In fact, the examples cited 
by Fenwick show that acquisition of territory by forceful con- 
quest was condemned by the international community. 
Sound policy considerations also dictate that conquest 
should not be recognized as a method of obtaining title to 
lands. By not recognizing conquest as a valid means of acquir- 
ing lands, the nations of the world announce that they will 
allow other countries to "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or 
other."60 This position furthers the desirable policy of protect- 
ing territorial integrity. 
56. Id. at 361 (quoting DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 
1889-1928, at 373 (Supp. I 1940)). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 361-62. 
59. See 3 VERZIJL, supra note 39, at 357-58 (citing several examples of "unlaw- 
ful" annexations by conquest that have occurred in our century). 
60. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, U.S.-U.K., 55 Stat. 1603 (1942). 
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This analysis shows that any Soviet claim to the disputed 
islands based on "conquest" is, at best, questionable. First, the 
legality of title by conquest under any circumstances is doubt- 
ful. Second, the Soviet takeover of the islands violated the 
policy of territorial integrity. Prior to 1945, the Soviet Union 
had no claim to  the Northern Territ~ries.~' Because the Soviet 
invasion of the islands occurred after Japan had unconditional- 
ly ~urrendered,~' the Soviet invasion fails to satisfy the princi- 
ple of "no aggrandi~ement."~~ 
IV. INTERNATIONAL GREEMENTS 
A. Certain Background Rules Governing 
International Agreements 
Before analyzing specific international agreements relating 
to  the four disputed islands, this section will examine some 
basic ground rules regarding the international law of treaties. 
This subsection will discuss rules regarding (1) the binding 
effects of international agreements on third parties, and (2) the 
interpretation of international agreements. Once these basic 
ground rules are set forth, the next subsection will examine, 
chronologically, the conflicting claims under the relevant inter- 
national agreements. 
1. The binding effect of international agreements on third 
parties 
Articles 34, 35, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties set forth the rules regarding the effect of an 
international agreement on states not parties to the 
agreement.64 Article 34 states the general rule that "[a] treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State 
61. See infia notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
62. Japanese Emperor Hirohito broadcast Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration on August 15, 1945. The Soviet invasion began three days later. The 
disputed islands were all conquered by September 4, 1945. STEPHAN, supra note 4, 
at  160-66. 
63. Atlantic Charter, supra note 60, at  1603. 
64. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Conven- 
tion entered into force on January 27, 1980. Although the Convention was not in 
force at the time the relevant treaties discussed in the text were concluded, the 
Convention does provide solid evidence of governing customary law. See SWEENEY 
ET AL., supra note 31, at 993. Articles 31 and 32 of the V i e ~ a  Convention are 
reproduced in the appendix. 
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without its ~onsent."~ However, this general principle is mod- 
ified by Articles 35 and 36. 
Article 35 explains when an international agreement can 
create obligations on the part of States not a party to  the 
agreement. The article reads, "An obligation arises for a third 
State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obliga- 
tion and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in 
writing."66 This language establishes two prerequisites for a 
treaty to be binding on a third party. First, the parties to  the 
treaty must intend to create an obligation on the part of the 
non-participating state. Second, the non-party state must ex- 
pressly accept the obligation in writing. The wording of the 
Convention requires that both of these prerequisites be satis- 
fied. 
Article 36 explains when a state not a party to an interna- 
tional agreement may obtain rights under the agreement. In 
relevant part, the article states: 
A right arises for a third State from a provision of a ' 
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to ac- 
cord that right either to the third State, or to a group of 
States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third 
State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as 
the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise 
provides.67 
Again, the parties to the treaty must have intended t o  
create a right in the non-party state. The second prerequisite 
requires the non-party state to agree to receive the right given 
it by the treaty. Unlike Article 35, however, Article 36 states 
that this second element will be presumed as long as there is 
no contrary indication from the non-party state. Commentators 
generally agree that these rules correctly state the effect of 
international agreements on third parties.68 
65. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 34. 
66. Id. art. 35. 
67. Id. art. 36. 
68. See, e.g., VON GLAHN, supra note 37, at 505; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622-25 (4th ed. 1990); cfi 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 49, 
$4 522-22a (treaty cannot give rights to non-party except by unanimous implied 
consent of all concerned and noting that the League of Nations could impose duties 
on non-member states); BRIERLY, supra note 49, at 325-27 (parties to treaty may 
confer a right on non-party if intent is shown); 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 458-61 (3d ed. 1957) (rights and duties may be imposed on 
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2. Interpretation of international agreements 
With respect to the rules governing the interpretation of 
treaties, commentators take two polar  position^.^' One side 
holds that "the text of an international agreement speaks for 
itself, and the task of interpretation is simply to give it a 'plain 
and ordinary' meaning."70 Others argue that  external 
evidence, such as the context of the treaty, its objects and pur- 
poses, and the preparatory work of the treaty, should be ac- 
corded equal weight with the text.?' 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention represent 
neither a strictly textual nor a strictly contextual approach. 
Rather, those articles combine the essential elements of both 
theories of interpretation. Article 31 provides that the starting 
point for treaty interpretation is the "ordinary meaning" of the 
text contained in the agreement.72 In addition, the context of 
the treaty shall be considered as it is contained in the pream- 
ble, annexes, and related agreements of the parties or agree- 
ments accepted by the parties. These extraneous agreements, if 
any, must have been made "in connection" with the treaty 
being interpreted. Article 31 also stipulates that consideration 
shall be given to subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, 
or rules of international law. Furthermore, the parties may 
give a special meaning to any term.73 In the event interpreta- 
tion under Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or is ab- 
surd, Article 32 provides that "[r]ecourse may be had to supple- 
mentary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its concl~sion."~~ 
Although commentators do not agree on the proper rules of 
treaty interpretation, "[mlost modern writers agree that two 
principles govern . . . in the interpretation of treaties."75 These 
principles are: "(1) the subject of interpretation [i.e., the text] is 
to determine the real meaning of the parties[] accepting the 
- 
non-parties with their consent or acquiescence). 
69. See generally SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 1017-35 (setting forth the 
arguments for and against using extrinsic sources to interpret treaties). 
70. CHEN, supra note 39, at 278. 
71. Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 495, 519-20 (1970). 
72. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 31. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. art. 32. 
75. VON GLAHN, supra note 37, at 502. 
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instrument; and (2). . . a treaty must be assumed not to be 
intended to be without effect or even to be abs~rd." '~ There- 
fore, in interpreting international agreements regarding the 
Russo-Japanese territory dispute, this comment looks first at 
the "ordinary meaning" of the text of the agreements, and then, 
if necessary, to other related agreements, subsequent agree- 
ments, subsequent behavior, and the circumstances surround- 
ing the making of the agreement. 
B. International Agreements Relevant to the Russo-Japanese 
Boundary Dispute 
The last 150 years have witnessed a complex series of 
agreements between Japan, Russia, and other interested na- 
tions, many of which have important ramifications in any at- 
tempt to resolve the boundary dispute between Russia and 
Japan. The most useful way to analyze these agreements is to 
approach them in chronological order. Accordingly, this section 
is divided into the following subsections: (1) the early agree- 
ments (1855-1905); (2) the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact 
(1941); (3) the Cairo Declaration (1943); (4) the Yalta Agree- 
ment of the major allied powers of World War I1 (1945); (5) the 
Potsdam Declaration of the major allied powers (1945); and (6)  
the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951). 
1.  The early agreements (1 855-1 905' 
This subsection briefly discusses the legal effects of three 
treaties between Japan and Russia, namely, the Treaty of 
Shimoda (1855), the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), and the 
Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). As explained earlier,?? the 1855 
Treaty of Shimoda drew a Russo-Japanese boundary line be- 
tween the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. This is the same 
boundary the Japanese seek to establish today. Some Japanese 
go so far as to propose that this treaty should be recognized 
today. For example, one historian recently stated, " 'The dis- 
pute has come full circle-back to that original Shimoda 
[Tlreaty signed by the shogun and the czar in 1855. . . . The 
question now is how the two sides can save face while essen- 
tially agreeing to recognize a treaty signed 136 years ago.' "78 
76. Id. 
77. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
78. Yates, supra note 5, 8 1, at 21, 24 (quoting Japanese historian Yumiko 
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Although such an  argument may seem to be good policy, it  
is not good law because the 1855 Treaty can no longer have 
any binding effect. Under international legal rules, it is clear 
that the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg extinguished the 1855 
Treaty of Shimoda at least insofar as the two treaties set 
boundaries in the Kuril Islands. Article 59 of the Vienna Con- 
vention on the Law of Treaties aptly expresses the rule: 
1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the 
parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same sub- 
ject-matter and: 
. . . .  
(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible 
with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not 
capable of being applied at the same time." 
Comparison of the relevant provisions of the 1855 treaty 
with the relevant provisions of the 1875 treaty plainly illus- 
trates that the two are incompatible. The Treaty of Shimoda 
established a boundary "between the islands of Etorofu and 
Uruppu," with Japan owning all islands from Etorofu south.80 
In the later treaty of St. Petersburg, Russia expressly ceded all 
"the Kuril islands which [it] possess[ed]" and placed the bound- 
ary line "between . . . Kamchatka and the islands of 
Sh i rnush~ . "~~  The result was to give Japan title to the entire 
Kuril chain. These separate provisions cannot co-exist. Conse- 
quently, the former is abrogated by the contents of the latter. 
The relevant provision of the Treaty of Shimoda must be con- 
sidered as  having no legal effect after 1875, except insofar as  
the 1855 treaty can give meaning (i.e., by interpretation) to 
later treaties. 
The 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth has nothing more than 
historical signXicance in the present debate. That treaty simply 
gave the Southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, but did not affect 
Japan's sovereignty over all of the Kurils granted under the 
terms of the Treaty of St. Petersburg. In sum, the net effect of 
the early treaties between Japan and Russia was to give Japan 
Noda). 
79. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 59. In addition, it is probably axi- 
omatic that a later treaty must govern over an inconsistent prior treaty. 
80. Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. 11; see also Map, supra part I. 
81. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. 11; see also Map, supra part I. 
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full legal title not only to the four disputed islands, but t o  all of 
the Kuril Islands, together with the southern half of Sakhalin. 
2. The Russo- Japanese Neutrality Pact 
By signing the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact82 on April 
14, 1941, Japan and Russia mutually promised to  maintain 
peaceful relations with each other, to remain neutral in case 
either party should become involved in hostilities with any 
other party, and to respect each other's territorial integrity. By 
its terms, the pact was to remain in force for five years from 
the date of ratification, and it was to be automatically renewed 
for an additional five years unless one of the parties denounced 
the pact "one year before the expiration of the term."83 On 
April 5, 1945, Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav 
Molotov announced the Soviet Union's intent not to renew the 
treaty.84 By declaring war against Japan on August 9, 1945, 
the Soviets made it clear that either the pact was no longer in 
force or the Soviets would no longer abide by it even if it were 
in force. 
"Japanese and Russians still disagree on whether the pact 
was or was not in effect after [April 5, 1945].''85 The Russians 
claim that Japan forfeited all assurances contained in the pact 
"[bly reneging on [its separate] promise to liquidate north 
Sakhalin oil and coal concessions and by aiding Germany in an 
aggressive war against the Soviet Uni~n.'"~ However, this 
argument is flawed because the oil and coal concessions were 
actually made in a separate agreement and were not part of 
the Neutrality pact." According to international law, the ma- 
terial breach of an agreement gives the injured party the right 
to cancel the agreement? However, the breach of one agree- 
ment does not grant the injured party the right to  cancel a 
separate agreement. Given this principle, the Soviet entry into 
82. Neutrality Pact, supra note 20. 
83. Id. art. 111. 
84. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 205 n.16. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 204; see also LENSEN, supra note 19, at 127-29, 279-81. 
87. See LENSEN, supra note 19, at 277-81. The concessions were part of an 
agreement entitled the "Protocol on the Liquidation of the Japanese Oil and Coal 
Concessions in North Sakhalin." This agreement came as a result of efforts to 
implement the understanding reached and embodied in the Neutrality Pad. The 
"Protocol" was signed in Moscow on March 30, 1944. Id. at 279-81. 
88. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 49, 8 547. 
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the war was a flagrant breach of the terms of its Neutrality 
Pact with Japan. 
3. The Cairo Declaration 
The Cairo Declaration was not a treaty per se, but was 
simply a statement of common purposes by the United States, 
Great Britain, and China regarding Japan." Japan and the 
Soviet Union were not parties to this agreement, although 
Stalin later expressed full approval of the D e c l a r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The 
declaration expressed the parties' intent to expel Japan from 
certain territories which it had taken "by violence and 
greed.'yg1 As a mere statement of common purpose, the Decla- 
ration did not confer any rights or impose any obligations on 
any party.g2 
Some debate exists as to whether Japan took the Kuril 
Islands by "violence and greed." However, according to the 
plain meaning of that phrase, Japan's conquest of the Kurils 
cannot be described as one involving "violence and greed." Ja- 
pan received title to the entire chain of the Kuril Islands by the 
Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875.'~ That treaty was concluded 
by mutual negotiation and involved no violence. 
However, some indication exists that the parties to the 
Cairo Declaration intended to include the Kurils in the phrase 
"all other territories . . . taken by violence and greed." Some 
historians suggest that U.S. President Roosevelt was either 
completely ignorant concerning Japanese possession of the 
Kurils or he was willing to sacrifice an enemy's territory to 
encourage Soviet participation in the war. "[Tlhe President was 
still under the misapprehension that Japan had wrenched the 
Kurils from Russia in 1905 'by violence and greed', thereby 
making the arc subject to the principle of territorial alienation 
enunciated in the Cairo De~laration."'~ If such misunder- 
89. This is self-evident from the language of the Declaration. See First Cairo 
Conference, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858 [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]. The rele- 
vant text of the Cairo Declaration is reproduced in the appendix. 
90. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 152. 
91. Cairo Declaration, supra note 89. 
92. It is worth emphasizing that Japan could not be obligated under the 
Declaration simply because it was not a party to and did not assent to the terms 
of the Declaration. See supm text accompanying note 66. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17. 
94. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 154-55 (citing CHARLES E. BOHLEN, WITNESS TO 
HISTORY 1929-1969, at 196-97 (1973)). 
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standing existed, President Roosevelt committed "a grievous 
error for which Japan paid dearly."g5 In the final analysis, 
since the Declaration was not legally binding on any party, 
whether or not the Kurils were taken "by violence and greed" is 
legally immaterial except insofar as the Cairo Declaration 
helps interpret later agreements. 
4. The Yalta Agreement 
As with the Cairo Declaration, Japan was not a party t o  
the Yalta Agreement. By the secret Yalta Agreement, signed on 
February 11, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and the 
Soviet Union agreed that within two or three months after 
Germany had surrendered, the Soviet Union would enter the 
war against Japan. As a condition for the Soviet assistance in 
the Far East, the parties agreed that "[tlhe former rights of 
Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 
shall be restored.'*6 More specifically, the agreement stated 
that "[tlhe Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet 
~nion."~'  
In 1956, the United States stated that it regarded the 
Yalta Agreement, like the Cairo Declaration, as "simply a 
statement of common purposes . . . and not as a final determi- 
nation by those powers or of any legal effect in transferring 
territorie~."~~ This position seems rather dubious for two rea- 
sons. First, the statement was made long after the Agreement 
was concluded and seems to have been a shift in policy. Second, 
the statement contradicts the United States' and Great 
Britain's commitment at Yalta that the "claims of the Soviet 
Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been 
defeated."" This shifting of position by the United States ap- 
pears t o  result from political tap dancing rather than from 
sound international law. loo 
The integral question is whether the Yalta Agreement has 
any binding force relating to the transfer of territory from Ja- 
95. Id. at 155. 
96. Yalta Agreement, supm note 22, cl. 2. 
97. Id. cl. 3. 
98. U.S. Position on SovietJapanese Peace Treaty Negotiations, DEP'T ST. 
BULL., Sept. 1956, at 484. 
99. Yalta Agreement, supra note 22. 
100. For a more complete summary of the U.S. position regarding the Yalta 
Agreement, see SWEARINGEN, supra note 10, at 190-92; STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 
153-55. 
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pan to Russia. The answer is that it does not. As discussed 
above, the Yalta Agreement could impose no obligation on Ja- 
pan to give up title to the islands unless the parties to the 
Agreement intended to impose an  obligation on Japan and 
Japan gave its express c~nsent. '~'  Russia may be able to 
claim that the former requirement was met, but no one can 
plausibly argue that Japan consented to receiving such an 
ob l iga t i~n . '~~  In short, the Yalta Agreement, the Cairo Decla- 
ration, and the Neutrality Pact all fell short of conveying, or 
imposing on Japan an obligation to convey, title to the disputed 
islands to Russia. 
5. The Potsdam Declaration 
The Potsdam Declaration may have succeeded where the 
Cairo Declaration and Yalta Agreement failed. The Potsdam 
agreement, concluded in 1945 for the purpose of setting the 
terms for Japanese surrender, was approve& by the United 
States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Uni~n. ' '~ Japan 
accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945.1°4 
Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration states, "The terms of the 
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereign- 
ty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, KJWS~U, 
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."'" Accord- 
ingly, the question raised is whether Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands are considered a part of the 
other minor islands as later determined. 
Under a strict reading of the text of the Potsdam Declara- 
tion, the Soviet Union may have a good argument that Japan 
gave up its title at least to Etorofu and Kunashiri. The declara- 
tion restricted Japan's temtory to "such minor islands" as the 
parties should determine a t  a later date. On September 8, 
1951, Japan renounced its right and title to the Kuril 
Islands.'OG Therefore, if any of the disputed islands are part 
101. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
102. However, one may plausibly argue that Japan consented to give the Kurils 
away by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. For a discussion on the 
effects of the 1951 treaty, see infra part N.B.6. 
103. Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1204 [hereinafter 
Potsdam Declaration]. Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration is reproduced in the 
appendix. See also STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 245. 
104. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 198. 
105. Potsdam Declaration, supra note 103, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
106. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c. 
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of the Kuril Islands, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration 
certify that those islands are no longer part of Japan.'" 
The relevant terms of the Potsdam Declaration are fairly 
ambiguous, especially when taken in the context of the later 
Treaty of San Francisco. But to the extent the language of the 
Potsdam Declaration remains unclear (what are "minor is- 
lands" and who is to make this determination), international 
law dictates that one consider the intent of the parties as facets 
of the "preparatory work of the treaty and circumstances of its 
conclusion."108 Historian John J. Stephan argues that Japan 
did not intend to give up its claim to the Southern Islands by 
accepting the Potsdam Declaration. He states: 
In accepting the Potsdam Declaration . . . Japan's leaders 
anticipated deprivation of the empire's conquests and annex- 
ations made since 1895. It is problematic whether they envis- 
aged the imminent loss of the Kurils . . . . They felt that the 
southern Kurils had always been Japanese and that the cen- 
tral and northern parts of the chain had been peacehlly ob- 
tained in 1875 . . . . But Japan's leaders were not aware of 
what had transpired at Yalta. Moreover, Soviet troops did not 
land on the Kurils until 18 August.log 
Japan's claim that Shikotan and the Habomais are includ- 
ed in "other minor islands" may survive its acceptance of the 
Potsdam Declaration. But in light of the fact that Japan gave 
up its claims to the "Kurile Islands" in the 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, the Japanese hold on Etorofu and Kunashiri 
becomes more tenuous. 
6. The San Francisco Peace Treaty 
At the end of World War 11, after the Japanese had surren- 
dered and after the Soviet Union had taken possession of the 
four disputed islands, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty on September 8, 1951."' Other signatories to  the trea- 
ty included the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet 
107. But see JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that 
the Potsdam Declaration is not valid and that, even if it were valid, the disputed 
islands are included in the phrase "such minor islands as we determine"). The 
question of what islands make up the "Kuril Islands" is addressed below. See infka 
part IV.B.6.c. 
108. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 32. 
109. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 198. 
110. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30. 
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Union refused to sign the treaty, reasoning that, among other 
things, the treaty would lead to a new war in the Far East."' 
Regrettably, a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Un- 
ion was left to later negotiations between the two countries. 
By signing the treaty, Japan formally renounced "all right, 
title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of 
Sakhalin and the islands adjacent t o  it over which Japan ac- 
quired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.""~ The language and cir- 
cumstances of this treaty raise three important issues. First, 
who was to acquire sovereignty over the territory that Japan 
renounced? Second, did the Soviet Union obtain legal rights 
from the treaty even though it refused to sign? Third, what are 
the "Kurile Islands"? 
a. Who was to obtain the Kurils renounced by Japan? In 
arguing that Japan has legal rights to the four disputed 
islands, the Japanese note that the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
"contained no provision indicating to which country these areas 
should finally bel~ng.""~ They hold that the Soviet Union's 
"unilateral measures" of exercising its authority over the is- 
lands "have no legal effect in transferring title to the Soviet 
Uni~n.""~ However, this argument does little to help Japan's 
cause. Regardless of which country was to exercise sovereignty 
over the Kurils, the fact remains that Japan at least gave them 
away to some other entity. 
The history of the prior international agreements and ne- 
gotiations leading to the San Francisco Treaty leave no doubt 
that the "other entity" that was to obtain the Kuril Islands was 
actually the Soviet Union. The Yalta Agreement, wherein the 
Soviet Union secretly agreed to assist the United States and 
Great Britain in the war against Japan, expressly stated that 
the Kuril Islands would be handed over to the Soviet 
Union.l15 In fact, Soviet assistance against Japan was at 
least partially conditioned on the "return" of the Kurils to Ja- 
pan, a condition to which the United States agreed? As a 
practical matter, "renunciation of the Kuriles and the southern 
111. See SWEARINGEN, supra note 10, at 76-79. 
112. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c. 
113. JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, at 9. 
114. Id. 
115. See supra notes 22-23, 96-97 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 22-23, 96-97 and accompanying text; see also STEPHAN, 
supra note 4, at 153. 
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part of Sakhalin was tantamount to de facto recognition that 
these territories had been ceded to the Soviet Union which 
occupied them at the time."ll7 
b. Did the Soviet Union gain any rights under the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty? As previously established, Japan can- 
not rightfully claim ownership to the islands that it expressly 
ceded in the 1951 treaty. And while it is incomprehensible that 
any state other than the Soviet Union could have been the 
intended beneficiary of the cession, it does not necessarily fol- 
low that the Soviet Union gained, by virtue of a treaty it re- 
fused to sign, automatic rights to claim the territory. 
Under international law,"' the Soviet Union could obtain 
rights to the Kurils under the San Francisco Treaty only if "the 
parties to  the treaty intend[ed] the provision t o  accord that 
right" and the Soviet Union "assent[ed] thereto."llg There is a 
presumption of assent.120 The actions of Russia are consistent 
with this presumption because it has not refused to take title 
to the Kurils and because it has continued to occupy and gov- 
ern the islands to the exclusion of all other countries. 
However, the parties to the San Francisco Treaty did not 
intend to give the Soviet Union a right to claim the Kuril Is- 
lands. As explained above,121 all parties who signed the trea- 
ty knew that, by default, the Soviet Union would continue to 
occupy and govern the Kurils. But that is not to say that the 
parties intended to give the Soviets the right to claim legal title 
to the Kurils based on the San Francisco Treaty. Rather, the 
fact that the parties to the treaty left final disposition of the 
Kurils ambiguous suggests that they did not intend to confer 
such a right on the Soviet Union. 
The ratification proceedings in the United States Senate 
lend concrete support to the argument that the San Francisco 
Treaty was not intended to bestow on Russia any right t o  claim 
the disputed islands. Attached to the resolution of ratification 
was a reservation that stated, in part, as follows: 
117. L. JEROLD ADAMS, THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE 
TREATIES 74 (1974); see also BERNARD C. COHEN, THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY: THE MAKING OF THE JAPANESE SETTLEMENT 17 (1957). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68. 
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. 35. 
120. Id. 
121. Supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. 
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As part [of ratification] the Senate states that nothing the 
treaty contains is deemed t o  diminish or prejudice, in favor of 
the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the 
Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to  . . . the 
Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the Island of Shikotan 
or any other territory, rights or interests . . . or to confer any 
right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Un- 
122 ion . . . . 
This reservation clearly states the Senate's intent that the San 
Francisco Treaty not confer any rights on the Soviet Union, 
including claims to the Kuril Islands. The resolution passed the 
Senate by a vote of 66-lo.'* In short, although the parties 
knew that the Soviets would effectively retain control of the 
Kurils, they did not intend for the Peace Treaty to confer an 
absolute Soviet right to control the islands.lZ4 
c. What are the "Kurile Islands"? Perhaps the most funda- 
mental tenet of the Japanese claim is that "the Habomais, 
Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu are not included in the term 
'Kurile ~slands.'"'~~ Japan contends that the Peace Confer- 
ence at San Francisco was aware of Japan's position and that 
"[tlhis understanding is also in accordance with other interna- 
tional arrangements binding on Japan."126 Japan further em- 
phasizes that the geography, including the flora and fauna of 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, is different from that of the islands to 
the north. 12' 
122. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, a t  3300 (U.S. Declaration). 
123. 98 CONG. REC. 2594 (1952). 
124. This distinction is probably the result of the "give and take" policy of the 
United States, which entered the Yalta Conference uninformed regarding the Kurils 
and then shifted its position on the islands in the late 1940s. This shift in position 
was due, in major part, to the onslaught of the Cold War and a reevaluation of 
the words and deeds a t  Ydta. See SWEARINGEN, supm note 10, at  190-92. 
125. JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 2, a t  10. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at  3, 10. The Japanese publication cited gives no verifiable information 
regarding the dissimilar geographic conditions of the various islands. An unscientif- 
ic (but fairly extensive) review by the author of several physical, geographic, and 
geologic maps revealed that Kunashiri and Etorofu are hard to distinguish from 
the islands to the north. The review did suggest that Shikotan and the Habomais 
may be quite distinguishable from Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the other Kuril Islands. 
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION, ATLAS OF JA- 
PAN-PHYSICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL 10-11 (1974) (showing that the geologic 
makeup of Shikotan and the Habomais is different from that of Kunashiri); see 
also STEPHAN, supra note 4, at  11-21. 
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If these arguments are correct, the four named islands 
should be considered "minor islands" that the Potsdam Declara- 
tion left to Japan. However, Japan has no legal claim to  any 
island that is part of the "Kuriles" because Japan unequivocally 
gave up all right and title to the Kuril Islands at San Francis- 
~ 0 . l ~ ~  
On the basis of the historical evidence, Shikotan and the 
Habomai Island group should not be considered part of the 
Kurils and were not considered such by the parties to the 
Peace Treaty. Therefore, they should be returned to Japan. On 
the other hand, Kunashiri and Etorofu should be regarded as 
part of the Kurils to which Japan has no legal claim.12' 
The text of the San Francisco Treaty does not define or 
declare exactly what islands are included in the Kurils. Accord- 
ingly, legal analysts must resort to other sources of interpreta- 
tion, such as other relevant agreements, the intent of the par- 
ties to the treaty, and the historical definition of the Kurils. 
Early agreements that set a boundary between Japan and 
Russia are of little help in defining the "Kuriles" because the 
relevant phrases of the agreements are subject to multiple 
interpretations. The Treaty of Shimoda gave "Etorofu . . . and 
the other Kuril Islands to the north . . . [to] Russia."130 "Oth- 
er" in this phrase could mean either those Kuril Islands other 
than Etorofu or those Kuril Islands other than those given to 
Japan. Unfortunately, the language is inconclusive. 
Likewise, the relevant language of the Treaty of St. Peters- 
burg is unclear. That agreement gave to Japan "the group of 
Kuril islands which [Russia] posse~ses."'~~ This phrase may 
suggest that Japan was receiving only that portion of the 
Kurils which Russia then possessed. On the other hand, the 
phrase could also be read to mean that Russia previously pos- 
sessed all of the Kuril Islands, but was now giving all of them 
t o  Japan. In short, prior agreements on the boundary issue do 
not clarify the definition of the "Kuriles." 
The records of the negotiation and ratification of the Peace 
Treaty provide some evidence of what the parties meant by 
128. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
129. This comment does not discuss whether it might be politically wise for 
Russia to make concessions on Kunashiri and Etorofu to obtain badly needed 
economic assistance from Japan. 
130. Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. 11. 
131. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. 11. 
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"Kuriles." These records suggest that the parties included 
Kunashiri and Etorofu, but not Shikotan and the Habomais, in 
the definition of Kurils. For example, a statement given by 
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida a t  the San Francisco Confer- 
ence suggests that he knew Japan was, at a minimum, 
renouncing title to Kunashiri and Etorofu.ls2 After expressing 
his hope that the United States and Great Britain would quick- 
ly return the administration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, 
the Prime Minister spoke of the "Southern Kuriles" that were 
occupied by the Soviet Union as of September 20, 1945. 
Although Prime Minister Yoshida made no request for the 
return of the Southern Kurils, he did specifically mention 
Habomai and Shikotan by name and reaffirmed Japan's claim 
to these two islands.lss Yoshida's lack of any reference to 
Kunashiri and Etorofu indicates that he considered those is- 
lands part of the previously mentioned "Southern Kuriles." 
At the same conference, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. repre- 
sentative, expressly stated the U.S. view that the Habomai 
Islands were not included in the geographical name "Kurile 
Islands" as used in article 2(c) of the treaty? Dulles' state- 
ment did not clarify whether the other disputed islands were 
part of the Kurils. 
The reservation attached to the treaty by the United States 
Senate also supports the proposition that the United States 
defined the Kurils to include Kunashiri and Etorofu, but not 
Shikotan and the H a b ~ m a i s . ' ~ ~  The reservation expressed the 
Senate's intent that the treaty not give the Soviets any new 
rights to "the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, [or] the 
Island of Shikotan."lsp This language clearly distinguishes 
Shikotan and the Habomais from the Kurils. Since the Senate 
made no express reference to Kunashiri and Etorofu, it can be 
presumed that the Senate intended to include those islands in 
the term "Kurile Islands." 
132. JAPAN, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM INUTES 327-32 11.23 (undated), reprinted in RAJENDRA K .  
JAW, JAPAN'S POSTWAR PEACE SMTLEMENTS 369-73 (1978). 
133. Id. at 370. 
134. Statement by John Foster Dulles, DEP? ST. BULL., Sept. 17, 1951, at 452, 
454. 
135. Since the assent of the United States Senate was required to bind the 
United States to the terms of the treaty, the meaning attached to the treaty by 
the Senate is relevant to interpreting any ambiguities in the treaty. 
136. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, at 3300 (U.S. Declaration). 
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Also persuasive is the argument that "[wlhen Japan re- 
nounced all rights t o  the 'Kurile Islands' at  San Francisco, 
'Kurile' was universally understood to include Kunashiri and 
[Et~rofu]."'~~ By the time the treaty was signed in 1951,- the 
Soviet Union had occupied the entire chain of Kurils, including 
Etorofu and Kunashiri, for six years. It is illogical for Japan to 
cede a chain of islands that have the same geographic and geo- 
logic characteristicsls8 and that are all occupied by a foreign 
power, and then later contend that the two southernmost is- 
lands are not part of that chain. 
Japan legitimately claims that Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islands are distinct from the Kurils. Geographically, those 
islands are separated from the chain of Kurils and seem to be 
more closely associated with Hokkaido than with the 
K u r i l ~ . ' ~ ~  Even the Russians have historically called these is- 
lands the "Little Kurils" as distinct from the "K~rils ." '~~ By 
ceding the "Kuriles," Japan did not cede islands that are not 
part of the "Kuriles." No evidence exists that Shikotan and the 
Habomai group have historically been considered part of the 
Kuril chain or that the signatories to the San Francisco Treaty 
considered them to be so. 
The dispute over a small number of islands off the coast of 
Hokkaido has caused a rift in Russo-Japanese relations since 
the end of World War 11. To this day the disagreement contin- 
ues to be a barrier to a Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty which 
would officially end the war. 
Under customary international law of prior discovery and 
conquest, neither country can legally claim title to the disputed 
islands. Conquest was not recognized as a legal method of 
acquiring title to land in 1945. Therefore, Russia cannot base 
its claim to the disputed territories on the legal theory of con- 
quest. As for the right to the territory by prior discovery, it is 
unclear who initially discovered and settled the Kuril Islands. 
Regardless of which party was first, the status of the territories 
has been modified by treaty. 
137. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 211 (emphasis added). 
138. Id. at 11-21. 
139. See Map, supra part I. 
140. STEPHAN, supra note 4, at 11. 
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Japan and Russia have been parties to several internation- 
al agreements concerning the boundary between the two na- 
tions. Under the terms of the early agreements, Japan had 
clear title to the islands in dispute until 1945, when it accepted 
the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. By expressly accepting 
the Potsdam Declaration and later expressly ceding the 
"Kuriles," Japan gave away its right to claim any islands that 
are part of the "Kuriles." Examination of the intent of the par- 
ties to the San Francisco Treaty, the historical treatment of the 
islands and their geography and geology, conclusively indicates 
that Etorofu and Kunashiri are part of the Kuril Islands, but 
that Shikotan and the Habomai group are not. Accordingly, 
Russia has rightful title to Etorofu and Kunashiri, but should 
be required to return Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan. 
Keith A. Call 
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Appendix 
Relevant Treaties and Agreements 
I. ARTICLES 31 AND 32 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES~~' 
Article 31 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to  the terms of the trea- 
ty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its pre- 
amble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made be- 
tween all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
comexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related t o  the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provi- 
sions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is estab- 
lished that the parties so intended. 
Article 32 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpre- 
tation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order t o  confirm the mean- 
ing resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, arts. 31-32. 
756 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreason- 
able. 
Article I1 
Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will 
pass between the islands Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole is- 
land of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of 
Uruppu and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute 
possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto 
(Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Ja- 
pan, as has been the case up to  this time. 
Article I1 
In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the 
island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty 
the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descen- 
dants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of 
the Kuril islands which he possesses at present, together with 
all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so 
that henceforth the said group of Kuril islands shall belong t o  
the Empire of Japan. This group comprises the following eigh- 
teen islands: [eighteen islands from Uruppu north to Araido 
are specifically named], so that the boundary between the Em- 
pires of Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the 
Strait between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka 
and the island of Shimushu. 
IV. SOVIET-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY PACT (APR. 13, 194 1)'" 
Article I 
Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful 
and friendly relations between themselves and mutually to 
respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other 
contracting party. 
142. Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 15, art. II. 
143. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 16, art. II. 
144. Neutrality Pact, supra note 20, arts. I-III. 
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Article II 
Should one of the contracting parties become the object of 
hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other 
contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the entire 
duration of the conflict. 
Article 111 
The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratifi- 
cation by both contracting parties and shall remain valid for 
five years. Should neither of the contracting parties denounce 
the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be con- 
sidered automatically prolonged for the following five years. 
V. RELEVANT TEXT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION 
(Nov. 27, 1943)'~~ 
The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and 
punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for them- 
selves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their 
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacif- 
ic which she has seized and occupied since the beginning of the 
first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has 
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan 
will also be expelled from all other territories which she has 
taken by violence and greed. 
VI. YALTA AGREEMENT (FEB. 11, 1945)'~~ 
The leaders of three Great Powers-the Soviet Union, the 
United States of America and Great Britain-have agreed that 
in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the 
war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into 
the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition 
that: 
. . . .  
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous 
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: 
145. Cairo Declaration, supra note 89. 
146. Yalta Agreement, supra note 22. 
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a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands 
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union. 
. . . .  
3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet 
Union. 
. . . .  
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that 
these claims 3f the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably ful- 
fded after Japan has been defeated. 
VII. THE POTSDAM DECLARATION (JULY 26, 1945)14'. 
8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out 
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands 
as we determine. 
VIII. THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY 
(SEPT. 8, 1951)'~~ 
Article I1 
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile 
Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adja- 
cent t o  it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a conse- 
quence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. 
147. Potsdarn Declaration, supra note 103, cl. 8 (footnote omitted). 
148. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, art. 11, para. c. 
